Mitos y falsedades sobre el realismo científico



Los proyectos selectivistas tratan de fortalecer el realismo científico, pero influyentes sectores de pensamiento (tanto anti-realistas como realistas) consideran que sus logros son no solo problemáticos, sino desatinados, porque desfiguran y devalúan el realismo, transformándolo en una posición que no vale la pena tomar en cuenta. Un examen de los diversos cargos formulados a tal efecto y sus respectivos antecedentes históricos sugiere, sin embargo, que los cargos en cuestión descansan todos en mitos y/o falsedades sobre lo que caracteriza a una posición como realista y que, en tal medida, fracasan como objeciones.

Palabras clave

realismo científico selectivo; selectivismo; representación científica

Texto completo:



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